Summary: There is a growing imperative for the United States and China to manage their inevitable disagreements and competition while deepening cooperation on common global challenges.
This Chinese New Year started off with a bang. Not the typical symphony of fireworks you hear across China to mark the beginning of a new lunar calendar, but rather the explosion of North Korea’s third nuclear test, close enough to China’s borders that its vibrations greatly worried many Jilin residents.
The test, in direct defiance of Beijing’s appeals and ill-timed so as to interrupt the new Chinese leadership’s observance of China’s most important holiday, was one of several events in 2013 that highlighted the growing imperative of the United States and China to manage our inevitable disagreements and competition while deepening cooperation on common global challenges.
After his formal selection as China’s new president in March, Xi Jinping distinguished himself much like the newly re-elected U.S. President Barack Obama had four years earlier, with a distinctive rhetorical call. In his speech to the National People’s Congress, Xi vowed to achieve the Chinese dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This vision includes domestic development goals to double China’s GDP and per capita income by the centenary of the Party in 2021 and become a modern socialist country by the centenary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049; and also aims to reestablish China on the world stage as great power.
Xi and his leadership team understand that in this era of globalization, achieving the Chinese dream will depend on a strong and stable U.S.-China relationship. The Obama administration, likewise, believes a stable, cooperative, and constructive relationship with China is essential to achieving America’s domestic and foreign policy objectives. Our two economies, financial systems, and trade are increasingly interdependent and our interests and destinies are deeply interconnected, lending our leaders strong incentives to avoid confrontation and unhealthy competition.
Despite these realisms, history shows that in eleven of fifteen cases since 1500 in which a rising power challenged a status quo power, destabilizing conflict resulted. China’s dramatic rise in economic power and international clout has presented Beijing and Washington with the challenge of how to manage relations between a rising power and a status quo power, amid increasing bilateral interdependence, tension, and strategic distrust. The opportunity to constructively confront this challenge and develop a strategy to prevent this trap between the US and China came to the fore in 2013 with the introduction of new leadership teams in both capitals.
Presidents Xi and Obama made a wise and historic decision to meet for a no neck-tie summit at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, California in June, which provided a valuable and necessary opportunity for both presidents to speak candidly and openly with each other, and start developing the trust that can provide the foundation for an enduring and constructive U.S.-China relationship. The informal setting of the meeting offered a chance for the two leaders to begin building rapport, setting a tone for improved relations, and gaining a better understanding of each other’s domestic, bilateral, and global visions.
At Sunnylands, Xi again put forward the idea of forging a new type of major country relationship between the U.S. and China, which he had first proposed during a visit to Washington in February 2012, when he was vice president. Obama responded positively to Xi’s proposal, explaining that the United States is willing to build a new model of cooperation with China based on mutual benefit and respect.
While the American leadership viewed this statement as a positive gesture indicating a willingness to explore this new model of major country relations concept, some in China concluded that Obama had rejected Xi’s proposal simply because Obama did not use the specific phrase “new type of major country relations” in his remarks. Far from rejecting the concept, Obama and the overall U.S. leadership were signaling that they accept the need to seriously and vigorously work toward reaching the goal of a new type of cooperation. But instead of a narrow focus on the specific words to describe the new framework, the Obama administration was indicating that it was more interested in understanding what specific actions the two countries could take to enhance cooperation, reduce differences, and ultimately achieve the theoretical model proposed by China. The U.S. was signaling it wants to explore this new concept with China, but only if the Chinese side agrees it can lead to greater cooperation.
This is exactly what U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice reiterated when she pronounced in her headline policy speech on America’s future in Asia in November, “we seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations” with China. Rice used the specific phrase proposed by China – new type of major country relations-–but she added a caveat-– perationalize. Rice’s careful choice of words were intended to send a clear message to the Chinese leadership that the U.S. is interested and willing to explore Xi’s concept of a new type of major power relations. But Rice’s use of the word “operationalize” was equally significant, signaling that the United States is foremost focused on determining how to turn this concept into a practical effort to enhance bilateral cooperation, rather than just coining a new bumper sticker or definition for the relationship.
So what does it mean then, to operationalize a new model of major power relations? The below four characteristics should serve as the core of this new practical cooperation:
First, the U.S. and China need to start actively cooperating together on global challenges where we have mutual interests. In the past, our countries have focused on bilateral issues. Today, however, the major challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-China relationship will come in working together to address critical global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, energy and food security, terrorism, climate change, Middle East instability, cyber security, and global financial reform and recovery.
The need to find tangible ways to work together constructively on global challenges was evident at Sunnylands. Obama and Xi concluded their discussions with an announcement to enhance cooperation on combating nuclear proliferation by continuing to apply pressure on Pyongyang, and to work together to combat climate change by discussing ways to reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons. If we can engage in more effort together that produce real benefits for our peoples as well as the rest of the world, this will be an important step toward making the new model of major country relations a reality.
Second, Chinese and American leaders will need to resist the expectation that either side will change the other side’s views on long-standing and historical areas of disagreement between our two countries—such as Taiwan or human rights— overnight. Many in Washington are concerned that the new model of great power relations concept is an effort by China to compel the U.S. to respect China’s core interests, create Chinese spheres of influence, and get the U.S. to accommodate China’s interests on Beijing’s terms. This type of approach will not work, and making this a starting point for discussions on the new paradigm will only set this exercise up for failure. On many of these issues, including Taiwan, the United States and China have agreed to disagree since their first communiqué in 1972. But in a more positive context of greater cooperation on global issues, our leaders will be in a better place to work on and reduce these areas of long-standing disagreement.
Third, our countries have new areas of tensions in the relationship that exacerbate mistrust and that we need to address with urgency. In 2013, these issues included revelations of Chinese cyber hacking of American commercial and military secrets to dangerous risks deriving from regional territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea, including Beijing’s recent announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone. These challenges, especially the latter, hold the potential for confrontation between our militaries if we do not renew our military to military efforts to increase transparency and cooperation. These important issues must be addressed head-on, not sidestepped. But as we work vigorously through these current disagreements, we should not allow these areas of friction to define or overwhelm our broad and robust relationship. But we must address them with urgency and find ways to reduce these disagreements and enhance trust if we are to achieve a new type of major country relations.
Finally, in order to forge a new model of major country relations that is sustainable, we will need to convince our publics that it is in the interests of both nations. To do this, we should identify several mutually beneficial headline initiatives that demonstrate to our publics the value of a cooperative U.S.-China relationship in a very public way. The U.S. and China could work together to eradicate a major childhood disease or epidemic. Another idea could be a collaborative space exploration such as a joint mission to Mars. On this score, we will need to hear from Chinese leaders where they think cooperation is possible, but if we can capitalize on our national strengths and use them to operationalize practical cooperative projects, we can show the world the power for good that the U.S.-China relationship can bring.
If we cannot find concrete ways to cooperate while managing disagreements and reducing differences, it’s an open question what will happen to this Chinese proposal. I am convinced the U.S. Administration will not be interested in simply inventing a new slogan for the U.S.-China relationship. Tangible areas of cooperation and concrete outcomes will be the most important features of this new framework, not the definition. After all, defining a new type of relationship is only useful if it actually achieves cooperation and prevents conflict.
If, however, we can find mutually beneficial ways to cooperate, this proposal holds great promise for both of our countries. But the lesson of 2013 is that the forging of a new model of major power relations does not end when both sides accept its premise, rather this is where our efforts begin. If we can shift our focus from whether the new definition of cooperative relations is accepted or not toward exploring ways to operationalize and achieve it, I believe the United States and China can pave a historic path to a prosperous future.
Originally by Paul Haenle, Source: English version from What Does a New Type of Great-Power Relations Mean for the United States and China?, Carnegie Tsinghua Global Policy Center, Jan 15, 2014;
Originally in Chinese from 中美新型大国关系意味着什么, Phoenix Weekly, Jan 16, 2014.
总结: 美国政府不会对仅仅提出一个中美关系新口号感兴趣。切实的合作领域与具体的结果才应该是这一新国家关系框架最为重要的特征，而不是简单的定义。毕竟，只有能够真正达成合作防止冲突，定义新型大国关系才有意义。
随着一声巨响中国迈入了蛇年，这一声响并不是中国庆祝农历新年的烟花炮竹声，而是朝鲜第三次核试验的爆炸声。由于试验地点临近中国边境，爆炸带来的震动使很多吉林民众感到担忧。
这次核试验公然藐视中国政府的呼吁，而且十分不合时宜，扰乱了中国领导人庆祝最为重要的传统佳节。这一事件连同2013年其它几大重要事件，突显出中美两国日益需要在加强合作应对全球挑战的同时，管理彼此间不可避免的分歧与竞争。
美国寻求“实际建立新型大国关系”
今年三月，习近平正式当选为中国新一届国家主席，他此后发表了别具特色的讲话，令人联想到四年前刚上任的美国总统奥巴马。习近平在全国人民代表大会的讲话中许诺要实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦，这一愿景包括达到中国国内发展目标，即在2021年中国共产党建党百年之际使中国国内生产总值与人均收入翻一番；在2049年中华人民共和国建国百年之际建成社会主义现代化国家；也包括在世界舞台上重建中国大国形象。
习近平与其领导团队明白，在全球化的时代背景下，实现中国梦有赖于建立强劲稳定的中美关系。同样，奥巴马政府也相信稳定、合作、建设性的中美关系是实现美国国内与外交政策目标的关键之所在。中美两国的经济、金融体系以及贸易的相互依赖程度与日俱增，两国的利益与命运也紧密相连，使得两国领导人有强大动力规避双方对抗与不良竞争。
尽管存在这些现实考虑，但自1500年起历史上大约出现过15次新兴大国挑战既有大国的情况，其中有11次都导致了破坏稳定的冲突。中国经济实力与国际影响力飞速发展，使中美两国政府面临这一挑战，即如何在双边相互依存、态势紧张与战略互疑日益加深的情况下处理崛起大国与既有大国之间的关系。随着2013年中美都迎来新一届领导层，两国可能有机会建设性地共同面对这一挑战，并发展出相应战略以防止两国关系陷入困境。
习近平主席与奥巴马总统做出了明智且具有历史性意义的决定，于今年六月在美国加利福尼亚州安纳伯格庄园举行了非正式会晤。这为两国领导人提供了珍贵且十分必要的机会进行坦诚、公开的对话，并开始建立互信，为持久且具有建设性的中美关系奠定基础。会晤的非正式性也让两位领导人开始建立个人关系，为改善两国关系定下基调，并增进对彼此国内、双边以及全球事务目标的了解。
在这次会晤中，习近平主席再次提出了构建新型中美大国关系的想法。2012年2月，习近平作为中国副主席在访美期间于华盛顿首次提出这一概念。奥巴马总统积极响应了其建议，并称美国愿意与中国在互惠互利、相互尊重的基础上建立新型合作关系。
美国领导层将这一表态视为一种积极姿态，表达了探索新型大国关系的意愿，但一些中国人却认为奥巴马拒绝了习近平的提议，原因仅仅是奥巴马在回应中没有使用“新型大国关系”这一词汇。远非是拒绝这一概念，奥巴马及美国领导层都发出信号表示他们认为需要认真且积极地致力于实现新型中美合作。奥巴马政府并不是狭隘地专注于表述新框架的具体用词，而是更想了解两国应采取哪些具体措施来加深合作、减少分歧并最终实现中方所提出的新型关系模式。美国表明愿意同中国一道探索这一新概念，只要中方认同这能够进一步扩大两国合作。
2013年11月，美国国家安全顾问苏珊•赖斯在发表题为“美国在亚洲的未来”的演说时反复强调，“我们寻求与中国实际建立新型大国关系”。赖斯使用了中国的原话（新型大国关系），但她也增加了一个重要信息——实际建立(operationalize)。
赖斯悉心挑选措辞旨在向中国领导人传递清晰的信息，表明美国有兴趣也有意愿探索习近平所提出的新型大国关系。但是赖斯所用的“operationalize”一词也同样意义重大，表明美国的首要关注在于如何将这一概念转变成为能够加深双边合作的实际努力，而不是仅仅为中美关系创造出又一新标签或是新定义。
中美两国如何开展务实合作
那么实际建立新型大国关系究竟意味着什么呢？下面所提到的四点就是这一新型务实合作的核心：
首先，中美两国需要开始积极合作，在具有共同利益的领域一同应对全球挑战。过去，我们两国一直只关注于双边事务。然而，如今中美关系的主要挑战与机遇都将来自于两国共同合作应对关键性全球挑战，如核扩散、能源与粮食安全、恐怖主义、气候变化、中东不稳定、网络安全以及全球金融改革与复苏等。
找到切实可行的方式建设性地应对全球问题的需求早在安那伯格庄园会晤中就已凸显。奥巴马总统与习近平主席以发表通告的方式总结了两人的讨论，声明中美两国要加深合作，通过不断向朝鲜政府施压来解决核扩散问题，通过商谈减少氢氟碳化物排放的方式来应对气候变化问题。如果两国能够更加努力合作，为两国人民乃至世界人民带来真正裨益，那么这将是迈向实现新型大国关系的重要一步。
第二，对于中美两国在一些历史性领域长期存在的分歧，两国领导人不应期待对方的态度会在一夜之间出现转变，如台湾问题和人权问题。很多美国政府官员担心中国提出新型大国关系概念是为了迫使美国尊重中国的核心利益、建立中国势力范围、并使美国按照中国政府的意愿做出调整适应中国的利益。这样的方式不会奏效，而且以此作为出发点讨论新框架只会导致失败。中美两国自1972年发表《联合公报》以来一直在很多问题上采取求同存异的态度，包括台湾问题。但在积极扩大全球问题上的合作这一背景之下，两国领导人能够更好地减少这些长期存在分歧的领域。
第三，中美两国在一些新领域也出现了紧张关系，这加剧了双方互疑，亟需解决。2013年这些问题包括中国通过网络黑客技术刺探美国商业与军事机密，以及南中国海与东海区域领土争端导致的风险（包括中国政府近来宣布了新防空识别区）。如果中美两国之间不在军事上增加透明度与合作，这些问题，尤其是后者，有可能会引发两国的军事对抗。我们必须正面应对这些重要问题，不能采取回避态度。随着两国大力合作解决现有分歧，我们不应让这些领域的摩擦定义或影响广泛且稳固的中美关系。但是如果想要实现新型大国关系，就必须尽快解决这些问题，并努力减少分歧增加互信。
最后，为了打造可持续的新型大国关系，中美两国需要让本国民众信服这一关系符合两国利益。要达成这一点，我们应该提炼出一些互利的重要举措，向两国人民公开展示中美合作关系的价值所在。比如，中美两国可以携手根除主要的儿童疾病或传染病；或是合作进行太空探索，如共同探索火星。因此，我们需要了解中国领导人认为的潜在合作领域，如果我们能够利用国力进行务实的合作项目，那么我们将能够向世界展示中美关系所能带来的正能量。
如果中美在管理并减少分歧的同时没能找到具体合作方式，那么中国这一提议的发展将不得而知。我坚信，美国政府不会对仅仅提出一个中美关系新口号感兴趣。切实的合作领域与具体的结果才应该是这一新国家关系框架最为重要的特征，而不是简单的定义。毕竟，只有能够真正达成合作防止冲突，定义新型大国关系才有意义。
然而，如果我们能够找出互利合作的方式，那么这一提议会给中美双方带来广阔前景。但是2013年的经验表明，打造新型大国关系并不以双方接受其前提而结束，而只是中美合作的开始。如果我们不再纠结这一合作关系的新定义是否有被接受，而是关注探索实现这一新型关系的方式，那么我相信中美两国将能够开创一条历史性道路，通向光明的未来。
作者：韩磊，来源： 中美新型大国关系意味着什么, 2014年1月16日, 凤凰周刊